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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS ON CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (1989)
Plaintiff filed suit against two newspapers, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation.'
During the 1983 Minnesota elections, reporters from three newspapers
and one television station exchanged promises of anonymity in return
for the plaintiffs news tip concerning a gubernatorial candidate. 2 Subsequently, two of the newspapers publicly identified the plaintiff as4
the anonymous source, 3 thereby causing the plaintiff to lose his job.
The trial court held that the first amendment did not bar the plaintiffs
claims 5 and found for the plaintiff on both counts and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. 6 The media defendants appealed. The
Minnesota court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part 7 and
HELD, the first amendment to the United States Constitution does
not bar a contract claim against media defendants. 8
Historically, the first amendment barred governmental infringement upon the freedom of the press. 9 However, actions of private
individuals fell beyond the scope of first amendment protection.'° Con1. 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn., Jul. 20, 1990).
2. Id. at 252-54.
3. Id. at 253.
4. Id. at 253-54.
5. Id. at 254.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 251-52, 262. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding for the appellee
on the contract claim and the accompanying compensatory damages. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's withholding of a judgment non obstante veredicto on the issue of misrepresentation. The dismissal of the misrepresentation claim removed the issue of punitive damages
from the instant case.
8. Id. at 254-55.
9. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom ... of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Under the Incorporation Doctrine, the
word "liberty" incorporates fundamental rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment thereby protecting those fundamental rights from state infringement. J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.6 (1986); see also Near v. Minn., 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (applying the ban on laws abridging the freedom of the press to the states).
10. See Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that suit for breach
of a fundamental right is only justiciable when a state or a person acting for the state encroaches
on the fundamental right); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that private
invasion of personal rights is not the subject of the fourteenth amendment).
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stitutional scrutiny only arose upon proof of state action impairing the
media's freedom to publish.", Therefore, absent a demonstration of
state action, no right to relief from private infringement of first amend2
ment rights existed.'
Facially neutral statutes that incidentally impair fundamental
rights do not always fulfill the state action requirement. The United
States Supreme Court examined a facially neutral statute that impinged upon due process in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks. 3 The
Flagg Brothers Court found no state action when a warehouseman,
utilizing state law, obtained a lien on the plaintiffs goods without
judicial review.' 4 The plaintiff alleged state action based upon the
state's authorization of the defendant's lien. 5 Since the plaintiff failed
to name a state official as a party,' 6 the Court analyzed the connections
between the defendant and the state. 7 The Court held for the defendant, finding state acquiescence in private action inadequate to convert
the warehouseman's action into an action of the state.' s
Even in the presence of state action, the Constitution permits
media regulation.19 In assessing the constitutionality of state laws imposing content-neutral media regulation, courts examine a variety of

11.

The Supreme Court stated:
While the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the question whether
particular conduct is "private," on the one hand, or "state action" on the other,
frequently admits of no easy answer . . . . [The] inquiry must be whether there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Generally, the Court required a state
law depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982) (use of law allowing pre-judgment attachment on debtor's property constituted state
action) and the existence of traditional indicia of a private individual-state government nexus,
see Lugar, 457 U.S. 922 (joint action test); Jackson, 419 U.S. 345 (nexus test); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (state compulsion test); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (public function doctrine).
12. See supra note 10.
13. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
14. Id. at 166.
15. Id. at 164-66.
16. Id. at 149-50. Naming a state official as a party would have added support to the
plaintiffs claim of state action. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(finding state action when the government enforced a private claim to the property of a debtor
by a creditor).
17. Id. at 157-66; see supra note 11.
18. 436 U.S. at 164.
19. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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factors, including state power, statute breadth, and burden on the
plaintiff. 20 Courts use a balancing test to weigh the state's interest in
enforcing the regulation against the burden imposed upon the media
plaintiff. 21 Significant state interest coupled with slight media burden
leads to a designation of constitutionality.2
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue,- illustrates an application of this balancing test. In Minneapolis Star, the United States Supreme Court examined the imposition of a state use tax on Minnesota publishers. 24 The law taxed paper
and ink products, but exempted the first $100,000 worth of materials
consumed in a calendar year.- The Court determined that the law
singled out the press for special treatment. 26 Although the Court recognized the applicability of general business laws to the media, 27 the
majority held that Minnesota could have achieved its goal of increased
revenues through more generalized means. 28 Utilizing the balancing
test, the Court determined that the media plaintiffs burden outweighed Minnesota's interest in raising revenue by means of the use
tax.- Therefore, the Court overturned the tax.Even when the state imposes a heavy media burden countered
only by a weak state interest, the media plaintiffs claim may fail due
to a waiver of constitutional rights. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
established the modern framework for waiver analysis in Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. Erie.31 In Erie Telecommunications, a cable company attempted to rescind 2 a franchise contract with the city govern3
ment based, in part, upon an infringement of first amendment rights.
20. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court examines whether the regulation was within the constitutional power of the government, whether the law furthered a
significant state interest, whether the burden on the plaintiff was incidental to the purpose of
the law, and whether the burden is not greater than necessary to achieve the state goal. Id.
21. This mode of constitutional analysis is similar to the mere rationality test. See Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
22. 449 U.S. at 456.
23. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 578.
26. Id. at 582.
27. Id. at 583.
28. Id. at 587-88. The court stated that Minnesota could have achieved its goal of increased
revenue through application of its general sales tax.
29. Id. at 593.
30. Id.
31. 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988)
32. A rescission amounts to the unmaking of a contract and not merely a termination.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

33.

853 F.2d at 1087-88.

679 (5th abr. ed. 1983).
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The court held that the media plaintiff waived its first amendment
rights in a previously signed release.34 The court recognized that constitutional rights can be waived when parties act of their own volition,
with full understanding of the consequences. 8 Yet, the court also
applied a nonwaiver presumption. 36 Within this framework, the court
overcame the presumption by finding compelling evidence of the media
38
plaintiff's waiver. 37 Accordingly, the court enforced the contract.
In the instant case, the media appellants combined the theories
presented in Flagg Brothers, Minneapolis Star, and Erie Telecommunications to support their claim to first amendment protection.
First, the media appellants argued that state action existed through
judicial enforcement of the private contract. 39 Second, the media appellants argued that constitutional analysis of the state action required
a balancing test. 40 Finally, the media appellants contended that no
waiver of first amendment rights occurred. 4 1 To uphold the trial court's
imposition of contractual liability, the Minnesota court of appeals
utilized a three-tiered analysis based upon the appellants' three

claims.42
The instant court considered whether state action existed by re43
viewing the history of first amendment protection afforded the press.
While the dissent claimed that the instant case threatened the viability
of first amendment protection, the majority recognized that neutral
44
application of state law does not necessarily constitute state action.
The court noted that court action may constitute state action where

34.

Id. at 1101. The release stated that the media plaintiff agreed to
release . . . the City of Erie from any and all claims, demands, actions, or causes
of action . . . of whatever nature, in any way relating to, directly or indirectly,
the Franchise together with any and all litigation arising from, or in connection
with, said Agreement including, but not limited to, the pending action from the
beginning of the world to the date of these presents.
35. Id. at 1094-96.
36. Id. at 1091.
37. Id. at 1101.
38. Id. at 1103.
39. 445 N.W.2d 248 (1989). The appellants argued that state enforcement of the contract
constituted state action under the rule in Shelly v. Kraemer. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 22, 23 (1948) (court action may constitute state action if the court's conduct constitutes "active
intervention").
40. 445 N.W.2d at 256-57.
41. Id. at 258.
42. Id. at 254-62. The court's analysis consisted of a determination of state action, a balancing
of state interests against media burdens, and waiver of first amendment defenses.
43. Id. at 256-58.
44. 445 N.W.2d at 255.
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the court engages in active intervention at the request of third parties. 45 The instant court found no active intervention by the trial court
since the parties contractually defined the content of published information.46 The majority reasoned that since the parties delineated the
7
press' freedom to publish, no state action attached.4
Further, the court distinguished the instant case from suits involving application of state defamation law to the media. 48 The majority
stated that defamation laws by their nature regulate speech.4 In contrast, the majority held contract laws do not regulate speech. 50 Under
contract law, the parties freely choose the terms and consequences of
the contract. Therefore, the court reasoned, an award of contract
damages does not constitute a state sanction on the press. 51 Finding
no state action in the instant case, the court of appeals could have
dismissed the media appellants' constitutional claim.52 However, the
court continued as if state action existed and advanced to its second
tier of analysis.
In its second tier of analysis, the court of appeals weighed the
competing interests of the state and the media. Utilizing the Minneapolis Star balancing testas the court examined the state's interest
in enforcing its general contract laws.- The dissent disputed the existence of a compelling state interest in enforcement of Minnesota contract law. 55 The majority, however, recognized an important state
interest in enforcing state contract law.- The majority noted the similarity between a contract to provide information to the media and a
contract to provide services to the media. 57 Thus, the majority

45. Id. at 255-56. See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (finding state action when third party used court
to enforce racially restrictive covenant).
46. Id. at 255.
47. Id. at 255-56.
48. Id. See N.Y. Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding state action when
private party sued on state defamation law).
49. 445 N.W.2d at 255.
50. Id. at 256.
51. Id.
52. Most protections of individual and political liberties guaranteed in the Constitution apply
only to the state and federal governments. Accordingly, state action serves as a basic component
of a prima facie case for unconstitutional action. Without a showing of state action, the constitutional provisions do not apply, and the court will not hear the case. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 9, § 12.1.
53. 445 N.W.2d at 256.
54. Id. at 256-58.
55. Id. at 264-66.
56. Id. at 256-57.
57. Id. at 257.
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reasoned that since a contract to provide services binds the media, a
contract to provide information should be equally binding.- The court59
also recognized the applicability of general business law to the media.
Accordingly, the instant court found a significant state interest in the
enforcement of Minnesota's contract law. 60
To complete the balancing test, the instant court considered the
burden created by enforcement of the contract. The dissent predicted
a heavy media burden.61 The majority disagreed. Based on the Supreme Court holding in Minneapolis Star, the majority found no absolute right of publication.62 The court also rejected the media appellants' claim that the newsworthiness of the appellee's name demonstrated an undue burden on the press.6 The instant court stated that
enforcement of a promise of confidentiality would not prohibit publication of information lawfully obtained without a promise of confidentiality.- Overall, the court found that contract liability would not intrude
upon the editorial process and that the state maintained a significant
interest in enforcing the contract. Accordingly, the instant court held
that Minnesota's contract law satisfied the Minneapolis Star balancing
test for constitutional enforcement against the media.65
In its third tier of analysis, the instant court examined the waiver
doctrine. Although the dissent argued that the reporters failed to
clearly waive their first amendment rights,6 the majority found a
waiver. Based upon the reporters' prior experience with promises of
confidentiality, the majority concluded that the reporters fully understood the consequences of their actions when they guaranteed the
appellee's anonymity. 67 Therefore, the court held that under the Erie
Telecommunications test, the appellants, through their agents, clearly
waived their first amendment defense.6
In the instant case, the Minnesota court of appeals followed the
modern trend of recognizing permissible infringements on the freedom
of the press. Previous rulings allowed regulation in areas of traditional

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

256-58.
256-57.
263-64.
256.
257.
257-58.

at 266-68.
at 258.
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governmental control, 69 including cases dealing with competing constitutional rights. 70 Under established precedent, cases involving media
regulation require a weighing of the competing interests of the state
and the media. 71 Courts, however, remain free to consider legislative
intent,72 scope of state law, 73 framers' intent, 74 the regulation's ability
to achieve the state's goal, 75 and other relevant factors to assess the
comparative weight of the state and media interests.
The instant decision endorses two broad policy objectives. First,
it protects justified expectations. 76 By requiring the media appellants
to pay damages, the court encourages fulfillment of future contractual
obligations and promotes certainty of contract. 77 Second, the instant
holding serves to acknowledge the modern importance of contract law,
which forms one of the cornerstones of a capitalistic society. By equating a contractual duty with a fundamental right,7M the court revitalizes
modern contract law and promotes application of contract doctrine in
resolving economic disputes.
An alternative analysis not explicitly undertaken by the Minnesota
court of appeals involves the application by analogy of the contracts
clause of the United States Constitution. 79 The contracts clause classifies state legislation impairing contractual obligations as unconstitutional.80 The contracts clause prohibits state laws from altering
preexisting contractual obligations. By analogy, state court holdings
which redefine contractual duties, although not unconstitutional,
should be discouraged.

69. See Minnesota Star, 460 U.S. 575 (recognizing applicability of general taxes to the
press); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (holding antitrust laws applicable to the
press), reh'g denied, 326 U.S. 1802 (1945); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937)
(acknowledging applicability of National Labor Relations Act to the press).
70. See Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (recognizing the binding nature
of the fourth amendment over the press); Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (acknowledging supremacy of investigative authority of a grand jury over the press).
71. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. 575.
72. Id. at 592.
73. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989).
74. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
75. Id. at 588.
76. 445 N.W.2d at 257.
77. Id. at 257-58.
78. Id. at 254-58. The instant court implicitly recognized the parity of contract law and the
freedom of the press in the absence of state action.
79. "No state shall [pass] any [Law] impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
80.

Id.
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Moreover, the United States Supreme Court allows impairment of
contractual obligations only when the state, acting under its police
power,8 1 seeks to advance a compelling state interest.- Even then,
contractual responsibilities cannot be permanently dismissed, but only
temporarily suspended. In the instant case, the media appellants
sought a permanent discharge from their contractual duty to preserve
the appellee's anonymity.84 Application of the contracts clause invalidates this action as an improper goal for state legislation. A similar
action in a state court, while not strictly forbidden, would likely be
disfavored.
The instant case establishes a precedent which combines immediate
impact with long range repercussions. The ruling creates another exception to the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
By binding media appellants to their contractual obligations, the instant court advocates the modern viability of economic regulation of
the media in matters not involving state action.
Furthermore, the instant holding adds to current judicial analysis
of the proper role of the media in today's society.6 Recognizing exceptions to the press' first amendment protection, the Supreme Court

81. See infra note 82. The Blaisdell Court recognized the inherent power of the states to
act in emergencies and to protect the security of their citizens.
82. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (allowing a two year
moratorium on mortgage foreclosures and establishing lowered mortgage payments during the
same period based upon a state of emergency during the Great Depression).
83. Id. at 439, 447.
84. 445 N.W.2d at 252-54.
85. For other examples, see Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. 575 (recognizing applicability of
general taxes to the press); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that
first amendment does not exempt press from antitrust laws); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (excluding fighting words from first amendment protection); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding National Labor Relations Act applicable to the
press).
86. The Supreme Court has stated:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection
it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy ....
The Government's
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever
free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare
the secrets of government and inform the people.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J. concurring); see also
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (Powell's plurality decision
debating the nature of speech protected by the first amendment); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 56-81 (1961) (Black's dissent espousing the absolute nature of the freedom
of the press), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961). But see Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49-56 (Harlan,
writing for the majority, espousing a balancing test for freedom of the press cases).
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has identified several interests outweighing the freedom of the press.
Applying public policy arguments, the Court carved out niches for
defamation7 and invasion of privacy.88 By finding liability in these
cases, the Court promotes the public interest and intensifies the debate
over the media's role in American society s9
Finally, long range analysis discloses the instant case's impact upon
cases involving the reporter's privilege. 9° By overriding the offensive
use of the reporter's privilege, the instant court may have opened the
door for infringement on defensive use of the privilege. 91 Although
courts refuse to recognize an absolute privilege,- 2 many states possess
media shield laws. 93 Future courts may rely upon the instant holding
as a basis for circumventing state shield laws and denying access to
the reporter's privilege.'
The instant court's application of contract doctrine to the media
achieves a legally, equitably, and jurisprudentially significant result.
Relying upon established precedent, the court reaches an equitable

87. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
88. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989).
89. See supra note 86.
90. Courts recognize a limited reporter's privilege allowing maintenance of the confidentiality
of sources in certain limited areas. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (finding some
protection of news sources necessary to the information gathering process). See also Comment,
The Dimensions of a Journalist'sShield, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 285 (1983).
91. Traditionally, this privilege has been used as a defense to requests for the reporter's
source of information. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In the instant case, however, the media defendants
attempted to utilize the reporters' privilege in an offensive manner: i.e. to prevent suit by the
reporter's source.
92. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that reporters can be required to
testify before grand juries).
.93. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.022-.025 (West 1988) (creating a statutory privilege
allowing reporters to maintain the confidentiality of their sources, but also establishing a judicial
bypass if the value of the information outweighs the press's interest in preserving its privilege).
But see In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978) (holding that New Jersey's shield law
must give way to sixth amendment rights and state constitutional provisions), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 997.
t On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the court of appeals and held for
the media defendants. 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn., 1990). The court reasoned that the parties did
not believe that they were creating a legally enforceable contract when the promise of anonymity
was made and were not thinking in terms of offer and acceptance. Id. at 203. Since the parties
did not intend to create a contract, the court refused to find a contract and therefore held for
the media defendant on the breach of contract claim. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not
address the constitutional matters discussed in this case comment. Accordingly, the reasoning
set out in this case comment remains unreversed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., d/b/a Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 1990 WL 162952
(U.S.) (U.S., Dec. 10, 1990) (No. 90-634).
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result without forced reliance upon a quantum leap of legal logic.
Although the first amendment recognizes a special constitutional role
for the press, it does not immunize the media from civic and legal
obligations. The media should not be able to use the first amendment
as a shield to ward off legal burdens borne by the rest of society. A
reporter, like any other citizen, is and should remain subject to general
laws and regulations. Changes in technology and social mores in the
last four decades have allowed the media to expand beyond its original
constitutional role. Consequently, through an offensive use of the first
amendment, today's media assumes privileges unavailable to the ordinary citizen. By applying traditional laws to the media, the instant
case helps to preserve the delicate balance of personal and political
liberties contained in the United States Constitution.
Dale Parker

